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the Court in Taylor vs. Nichols et al., 29 Vt. 104, to the effcct
that this requirement of the official oath is mere form, and should
be regarded as directory merely. The action was on a receipt
given by the defendants to the plaintiff as sheriff, and the defence
was that the sheriff never gave any legal recognisance as such, and
therefore never became legally sheriff. The Court inclined to consider the recognisance itself valid, but held, that whether so or
not, as the plaintiff was a good officer de facto, and the attachment,
therefore, legal between the parties, and as this suit was merely
to enforce the attachment for the benefit of the creditor, the action
could be maintained. It does not appear from the case that any
question arose as to the plaintiff having taken the oath of office,
and what was said on this point by the learned judge was merely
by way of illustration, and probably without particular examination of the precise point involved in his observation.
The judgment of the County Court is reversed, and judgment
rendered for the plaintiff for the damages assessed by the County
Court.

In the District Court of the United States for the District oJ
Wisconsin.
THE UNITED STATES VS. TiE PROPELLER "SUN."
1. A vessel propelled in whole or in part by steam, is not liable to a penalty for
transporting goods, wares and merchandise, without inspection of the hull and
boilers, under the act of Congress of August 30, 1852.
transporting passengers.

The penalty is alone for

2. An answer to a libel of information must be full and explicit.to each article. It
must deny the charges, or confess and avoid them by proper averments of facts.
Quere.-Can a vessel belonging at the port of Buffalo, where inspectors are located

by the act of August 30, 1852, be inspected at the port of Chicago ?

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-By the information this propeller was seized by
the Collector at the port of Milwaukee, on the 6th of October,
1861, for the following causes:
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1st. That on the 20th of September, 1861, the propeller did
transport goods and passengers from Milwaukee to Goderich, in
Canada, without first having complied with an act of Congress,
approved July 7, 1838, entitled "an act to provide for the better
security of the lives of passengers on board of vessels propelled
in whole or in part by steam," and the act of August 30, 1852,
entitled "an act to amend an act," &c., in this, that the hull of
said propeller had not been inspected pursuant to the provisions
of the ninth section of the last act within one year prior to the
20th of September, 1861. For each of said violations a penalty
of five hundred dollars is claimed.
2d. That on the 28th of September, 1861, the vessel did transport goods and passengers from the port of Goderich to the port
of Milwaukee, without inspection of her boilers, and for each violation of the act a penalty of five hundred dollars is claimed.
Respondent answers, that the vessel was licensed at Buffalo, and
was employed in the business of commerce and navigation between
the ports of Chicago and Milwaukee, on lake Michigan, and the
port of Goderich, in Canada. That the hull and boilers of the
vessel were inspected at the port of Chicago, and certificate issued
on the 19th of September, 1860, and on the 8th of September,
1861, before the certificate had expired, respondent caused an
application to be made to the inspectors at Chicago, for the inspection of the hull and boilers of the propeller; and on the 28th of
the same month a second application was made.
At the time of the first application the inspectors were absent
from Chicago, and at the time of making the second application
the inspectors had not the pumps and necessary machinery for
making the inspection, and that one of the inspectors was then
absent. The propeller was inspected at Chicago on the 8th of
October following, when a certificate was issued by the inspectors;
and there are no local inspectors on lakes Huron and Michigan.
To the answer, the District Attorney filed exceptions: That
respondent had not fully and distinctly answered the libel, and
the matters set forth are immaterial and irrelevant.
Before considering the exceptions, it may be proper to inquire
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what the respondent should answer to. The libel is intended to
charge that the propeller is liable to a penalty of five hundred
dollars, for carrying goods, &c., and a like penalty for carrying
passengers from Milwaukee to Goderiph, and similar penalties for
carrying goods and passengers from Goderich to Milwaukee, without having been first inspected, as required by the acts of July 7,
1838, and August 30, 1852.
The act of July 7, 1838, 5 Statutes, 304, entitled "an act to
provide for the better security of the lives of passengers on board
of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam," directs in section 2: "that it shall not be lawful for the owner, master, or
captain of any steamboat, or vessel propelled in whole or in part
by steam, to transport any goods, wares or merchandise, or passengers, in or upon the bays, lakes, rivers, or other navigable
waters of he United States, without having first obtained from
the proper officer a license under the existing laws, and without
having complied with the conditions imposed by this act; and for
each violation of this section the owners of said vessel shall forfeit
and pay to the United States the sum of five hundred dollars, the
one-half to the use of the informer, and for which sum or sums the
steamboat or vessel so engaged shall be liable, and may be seized
and proceeded against summarily, by way of libel, in any District
Court of the United States having jurisdiction of the offence."
The act then directs the appointment and duties of inspectors of
hulls and boilers of such boats and vessels.
The act approved August 30, 1852, 10 Statutes, 61, is an act
to amend the act of July, 1838. The first section directs: "That
no license, registry, or enrolment under the provisions of this or
the act to which this is an amendment, shall be granted, or other
papers issued by any collector to any vessel propelled in whole or
in part by steam, and carrying passengers, until he shall have
satisfactory evidence that all the provisions of this act have been
fully complied with; and if any such vessel shall be navigated,
with passengers on board, without complying with the terms of
this act, the owners thereof and the vessel itself shall be subject
to the penalties contained in the second section of the act to which
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this is an amendment." The whole object and scope of the last
act was to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers, and it provides a full and perfect system for the inspection
of the hulls and boilers of vessels propelled in whole or in part by
steam, and carrying passengers. By the section of the act above
quoted, the penalty prescribed in the second section of the act of
July, 1838, is continued as to vessels navigated with passengers
on board, without complying with the terms of the act in regard
to inspection. The penalty in the act of July, 1838, for transporting goods, wares, and merchandise on vessels not inspected, is
not embraced in the act of August, 1852; and by this last act all
parts of laws heretofore passed, which are suspended by, or inconsistent with the act, are repealed. That provision in the act of
July, 1838, was outside of the object of the act, and in the subsequent act it is entirely omitted. In this respect the two acts are
inconsistent, and the provision of the last act must prevail. This
is a penal statute, and it must be construed literally. The
respondent is not required to answer that part of the libel, of
information claiming a penalty for transporting on this propeller,
goods, wares, or merchandise, without previous inspection of her
hull and boilers.
The exceptions to the answer will have to be allowed.
The answer neither denies nor confesses the charges. The
respondent must fully and explicitly answer the several articles
of the libel. He must deny the several articles, or confess and
avoid them by a proper allegation of facts.
By the answer, the propeller was licensed at the port of Buffalo
Creek, on the 5th of April, 1861. There is no allegation that
since then she has been transferred to any other port. It is also
alleged that her hull and boilers were inspected at the port of
Chicago, on the 19th of September, 1860; and that before the
certificate expired, and again on the 28th of September, 1861,
application was made to the inspectors at Chicago for inspection,
which was not done for the reasons stated. It is not alleged that
the application was in writing, as the law requires; nor does it
appear that the inspectors at Chicago had any official right to
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perform the duty. By section 9 of the act of August, 1852,
inspectors were directed to be appointed at Bufflo, which was the
port where this propeller belonged. The inspectors are to perform the services required of them by the act, within the respective
districts for which they shall be appointed; and by the twelfth
specification of the section, the Board, when thereto requested,
shall inspect steamers belonging to districts where no such Board
is established. If this propeller belongs at the port of Buffalo
Creek, it is questionable whether a certificate of inspection at the
port of Chicago should be adjudged a compliance with the law.
But this subject can be more maturely examined hereafter.

THE UNITED STATES VS. THE

STEAMBOAT " SENECA."

A steamboat employed in transporting passengers between ports in the same State,
is not liable to a penalty for not having the hull and boilers inspected under the
act of Congress of August 30, 1852, and the District Court has no jurisdiction.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-It
is propounded in the information, that at the
port of Superior, on Lake Superior, in this District, the Collector
of Customs for the Collection District of Michilimackinac, did
seize said steamboat and now holds her in his custody within this
District, as forfeited to the United States for carrying and transporting goods and passengers between the ports of Superior and
Bayfield, on Lake Superior, within this State, without license and
the inspection of her hull and boilers required by the Acts of Congress of July 7th, 1888, and August 30th, 1852, and in violation
of those acts.
By the information, this steamboat was engaged exclusively in
transporting passengers and property between the ports mentioned in the information, which are located on Lake Superior,
and within the State of Wisconsin.
It is well settled that the constitutional power of Congress "to
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regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
States," does not embrace the purely internal commerce of a
State: Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Brooks vs. The Steamboat
Peytona, 2 Law Monthly, 518; Whitaker vs. The Steamboat Pred.
Lawrence, Id. 520; The New Jersey Steam Navigation Company
vs. The 14Merehants' Bank, 6 Howard, 344; Allen vs. Newbury, 21
Howard, 244.
The act of Congress of July, 1838, provides that it shall not be
lawful for the owner, master or captain of any steamboat or vessel
propelled in whole or in part by steam, to transport goods, &c., or
passengers, in or upon the bays, lakes, rivers, or other navigable
waters of the United States, without having first obtained from
the proper officer a license under existing laws and without the
inspection required, under a penalty of five hundred dollars for
each violation of the act. And the act of August, 1852, continues
this penalty, for transporting or carrying passengers without inspection. The terms of the act embrace the local employment of
this steamboat; but the act must be construed according to the
constitutional provision as expounded by judicial authority. The
steamboat was employed between places within this State. The
contract of affreightment with the steamboat Fashion, in Allen vs.
Newbury, was for the transportation of leather on Lake Michigan
between ports in this State. The contract with the steamboat
Fred. Lawrence, was for a passage on the Mississippi river,
between ports in this State. The license required by the act is
for carrying on the coasting trade, and the inspection is for the
security of the lives of passengers on board of steam vessels. It
is evidently an act for the regulation of commerce under the constitution. From the decisions referred to, it is apparent that this
Court in Admiralty would not have jurisdiction of this steamboat,
while engaged as propounded in the information. And it appears
very plainly that jurisdiction cannot be maintained of this information, for the reason that the steamboat is not alleged to be employed
in the foreign or coasting trade, but was running between ports
and places within the State of Wisconsin; and she was exclusively
within and subject to State regulations and control. The Distilet
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Court for the State of Missouri, in The United States vs. The
Steamboat James Monroe, and The United States vs. The Steam
FerryboatPope, 1 Newbury's Reports, 241 and 256, holds the same
opinion.
The information will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1862.
ALEXANDER DEAN AND WIFE vs. DANIEL NEGLEY AND

STERLEY

CUTHBERT.
1. In an issue to try the validity of a will, which was contested on the ground of
undue influence, want of mental capacity, coercion, and on other grounds, it
appeared that, by the alleged will, the testator gave a trifling sum to his only
legitimate child, and then bequeathed the residue of his property to the children
of a woman with whom he was alleged to have been living in adulterous intercourse. There was no direct evidence given or offered af want of mental capacity at the time, or of any actual coercion or influence exerted in the testator as
respects the testamentary act; but it was proposed to prove the fact of this adulterous intercourse, which was of long continuance, and which had obliged his
wife and daughter to abandon his house, and that the alleged adulteress was a
woman of vigorous character, and exerted a despotic influence over his actions
generally, in connection with the fact that he was suffering from a painful
disease, to relieve which he took opiates, as tending to show undue influence
Held, that the evidence was admissible for this purpose, on the
ground that the relation being an unlawful one, the influence which sprang from
it must also be unlawful.
2. ,Semble, by LOWRIE, C. J., that this would be a presumption of law.
generally.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny county.
This was an issue of devisavit vel non, directed by the Register's
Court of Allegheny County, and tried in the Court below, to determine the validity of a paper purporting to be the last will and
testament of one William Johnston, who died on the 4th of December, 1860. By this paper, which bore date the 23d day of
December, 1857, the alleged testator, after providing for the payment of debts and legacies in the usual way, and for the erection
of a monument to his memory, bequeathed to his only child and
daughter, Elizabeth, then Elizabeth Dean, (plaintiff in error,) the
sum of $20. He then gave and bequeathed the residue of his
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estate to Sarah Bell Bolton, Eliza Bolton, Olivia Bolton, Josephine
Bolton, and Annie Bolton, daughters of John and Rosana Bolton,
in the manner therein set forth, in token of his friendship for
them. And he appointed the defendants in error, Daniel Negley
and Sterley Cuthbert, to be his executors.
The paper, on its face, was duly executed as a will. To its
admission as such, a caveat was filed by the plaintiffs in error on
the following grounds:
That the testator was of non-sane mind and memory at the
time of the execution of the alleged will; that it was procured
by fraud, coercion, or undue influence; that, at the time of executing it he labored under a monomania, weakness, and delusion
in respect to his heir-at-law, which had an undue influence on his
judgment; and that he was so importuned by parties having an
interest in depriving his relatives of his estate, as to amount to
coercion.
On the trial of the issue, the executors, in support of the will,
produced the subscribing witnesses, who testified to its due execution, and very distinctly to the sanity of the testator at the time.
On behalf of the contestants, after the proof of the marriage
of the testator to Mrs. Jerusha Butler, a widow, the mother of
Mrs. Elizabeth Dean, the testator, only legitimate child and heir,
Dr. A. H. Gross, the attending physician, was called as a witness,
and testified that the testator had for ten years been affected by
cancer of the eye and nose, of which disease he at last died.
The disease had been, as usual, treated with opiates. He could
not rest without them. The habitual use of opium is always
detrimental to the mind. The use of opium was commenced in
the latter part of 1857-at first in moderate doses, and afterwards
constantly.
The testator boarded for some time with Mrs. Bolton. She
nursed him, and undoubtedly had a great influence over him when
nursing him. "She was," said the witness, "a vigorous, managirg
kind of woman, such as could manage a man pretty well. A person under the influence of opiates and a painful disease is more
liable to be subject to the influence of his nurse.
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"I knew Johnston well; I don't think man or woman could control him past his pleasure when he was not under the influence of
opium or suffering. When not under pain or opiates, he had a
decided will of his own; when under opiates or pain, he was more
liable to influences. In 1857 and 1858, his use of opiates was very
moderate. When not under the paroxysm of pain or use of
opiates, in 1858 or 1859, he was of as sound mind as any man. I
never knew of any defect of mind till lately, in 1860.
"Mrs. Bolton was a good nurse; Johnston was very well
nursed."
The contestant then offered to prove that the testator had been
living in an adulterous connection with Mrs. Bolton, the mother of
the residuary devisees, for many years; that the connection, which
began about sixteen years after his marriage, was so notorious and
conducted in such a manner as to compel Mrs. Johnson, with her
daughter, (then about fourteen years old,) to leave his house; and
that after the separation, his illicit intercourse with Mrs. Bolton
continued uninterruptedly till his death.
That the opiates which the testator had been obliged to take on
account of his disease, had weakened his mind, and made him
more or less subject to the control of those about him, and particularly to that of Mrs. Bolton, in his business transactions and
otherwise.
That "Mrs. Bolton was a woman of masculine vigor and understanding, and exercised a despotic influence over Johnston in relation to many of his business transactions, interfering with his
contracts where they did not suit her views, and inducing him to
annul or alter them according to her pleasure and dictation, and
this both before and after the making of the will. That Mrs.
Dean, both before and after the making of the will, visited her
father, with the expectation of having confidential and private
conversation with him, and upon every such occasion Mrs. Bolton,
or some member of her family, remained in her room, so that no
such intercourse could take place.
"1That Mrs. Dean was always anxious and ready to go and nurse
her father during his illness, and to reside with him or have him
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reside with her, on condition that he would sever his connection
with Mrs. Bolton, of which he was fully aware, and had expressed
himself in terms of affection for her, but still refused to sever his
connection with Mrs. Bolton."
And that the only source and basis of the testator's fortune was
the income derived from his wife's estate, which he had saved and
invested.
The offer of this evidence was made in connection with the disposition of the will, for the purpose of showing undue influence
by Mrs. Bolton in procuring the execution of the will.
To this offer the proponents of the will objected (except so for
as it was proposed merely to show the extent of the testator's
property, and the condition of his mind from disease and the application of opiates) for the following reasons, viz.: because,
1. The evidence offered did not tend to throw any light on the
testamentary capacity of the testator at the time of making his
will.
2. That the fact of alleged adultery aid not tend to show undue
influence by Mrs. Bolton over the testator at the time of making
his will.
3. The acts, declaration, or conduct of Mrs. Bolton, she not
being interested in law in establishing the will, -were not evidence.
4. The offer did not show, or tend to show, undue influence by
any one in setting up the will.
The learned judge overruled the offer for the foregoing reasons,
and also because the contestants' counsel did not propose to follow
it up by testimony tending to show that fraud, deceit, coercion, or
other undue influences were actually used by Mrs. Bolton, or that
the will was made under such influences.
The contestants, then, in connection with their previous offer,
proposed to prove that Mrs. Bolton did, within a few days prior to
the date of the will, use undue influence on the mind of the testa,
tor, so as to induce him to annul a lease that he had made, and to
assert as a reason for so doing, tlhat he was out of his mind at the
time of entering into the same.
This additional offer was also overruled by the learned judge,
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because it was not proposed to show thereby that her influence
was exerted in any way to procure him to make the alleged will,
and that it could not be inferred that the will was made under
undue influence, from the fact that Mrs. Bolton had great influence with the testator, atid used it for other purposes.
The jury having found for the will, these rulings wdre assigned
for error here.
Oharles Shaler and Bruce & Negley, for plaintiff in error.
Marshall& Brown, for defendants in error.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LOWRIE, C. J.-The will of a man who has testamentary capa-

city cannot be avoided merely because it is unaccountably contrary
to the common sense of the country. His will, if not contrary to
law, stands for the law of descent of his property, whether his reasons for it be good or bad, if they be indeed his own, uninduced by
unlawful influence from others. Lawful influence, such as that
arising from legitimate or social relations, must be allowed to produce its natural results, even in influencing last wills. However
great the influence thus generated may be, it has no taint of unlawfulness in it; and there can be no presumption of its actual unlawful
exercise merely from the fact that it is known to have existed, and
that it has manifestly operated on the testator's mind as a reason
for his testamentary dispositions. Such influences are naturally very
unequal, and naturally productive of inequalities in testamentary
dispositions; and as they are also lawful in general, and the law
cannot criticise and measure them so as to attribute to them their
proper effects, no will can be condemned because the existence of
such an influence can be proved, and because the will contains in
itself proof of its effect. It is only when such influence is unduly
exerted over the very act of devising, so as to prevent the will from
being truly the act of the testator's, that the law condemns it as a
vicious element of the testamentary act; so the law always speaks
of the natural influence arising out of legitimate relations. But we
should do violence to the morality of the law, and therefore to law
itself, if we should apply this rule to unlawful, as well as-to lawful
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relations; for we should thereby make them both equal in this
regard at least, which is contrary to their very nature. If the law
always suspects, and inexorably condemns undue influence, and
presumes it from the nature of the transaction, in the legitimate
relations of attorney, guardian, and trustee, where such persons
seem to go beyond their legitimate functions, and work for their
own advantage, how much more ought it to deal sternly with unlawful relations, where they are, in their nature, relations of influence over the kind of act that is under investigation. In their
legitimate operations those positions of influence are respected;
but where apparently used to obtain selfish advantages, they are
regarded with deep suspicion; and it would be strange if unlawful
relations should be more favorably regarded.
And the voice of the law on this general subject is distinct and
emphatic, transmitted through many generations, and embodied in
many Latin maxims, of which the following are some: Nemo commodum capit de injuria sua. Nemo ex proprio dolo consequitur
actionem. Frustra legis auzilium petit, qui in legem committit.
Pacta, quce contra bonos mores sunt, nullam vim habent. -z dolo
In do, ex malificio, ex turpi causa, ex pacto illicito, non oritur actio.
Ex injuria non oritur Jus. Pacta, quce turyem causam habent,
non sunt observanda. in odium &poliatoris,omnia rceasumuntur.
All of which may be summed up in one sentence-No one shall
derive any profit through the law by the influence of an unlawful
act or *relation.
The ordinary influence of a lawful relation must be lawful, even
where it affects testamentary dispositions, for this is its natural
tendency. The natural and ordinary influence of an unlawful
relation must be unlawful, in so far as it affects testamentary dispositions favorably to the unlawful relation and unfavorably to
the lawful heirs. Ordinary influence may be inferred in both
cases, where the nature of the will seems to imply it; but in the
former case it is right because the relation is lawful, and in the
latter it may be condemned, together with all its effect, because
the relation is unlawful.
It is not inconsistent with this, that it has been decided that the
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devise of a wife to her second husband was not affected by the fact
that she knew she had a husband living at the time of her second
marriage, even though the second husband heard of it before her
death; for this shows no conscious transgression of law by him in
marrying her, and her heirs could not set up her fraud on him as
a reason for avoiding her will: 8 Harris, 329.
There can be no doubt that a long-continued relation of adulterous intercourse is a relation of great mutual influence of each over
the mind and person and property of the other. History abounds
with proofs of it, and it requires no very long life or very close
observation of persons around us in order to reveal the fact. Our
divorce law of 1815 shows its abhorrence of the crime and its influence, by.forbidding any one, divorced for adultery, from marrying his or her particeps criminis while the injured consort is living,
and by disabling a woman thus divorced from devising or conveying her property, if she cohabit with her paramour. And the
Canon Law, though it allowed children born before marriage, to
be legitimized by a subsequent marriage, refused this privilege to
children born of adulterous intercourse, and did not allow even a
devise in their favor from the faulty parent.
If, then, there was such a relation between the testator and Mrs.
Bolton, at the time of the making of this will, as was offered to be
proved, we think that that fact, taken in connection with the devise
to Mrs. Bolton's daughters, is evidence of an undue influence exerted by her over the testator and affecting the dispositions of his
will, and that it may justify a verdict against the validity of the
will. I have, myself, thought that it raised a presumption of law
of undue influence, but we do not so decide, but leave it as a question of fact merely. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
evidence offered ought to have been received.
Judgment reversed and a new trial awarded.
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GOULD vs. THE TOWN OF STERLING.

In the New York Court of Appeals.
BENJAMIN GOULD, RESP., VS. THE TOWN OF STERLING, APPEL'T. 1
By the provisions of a statute, the Supervisor and Commissioners of the town of
S. were authorized to borrow a sum of money, not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars, upon the credit of the town, and to execute therefor, under their
official signatures, a bond or bonds. They were to have no power to do any of
the acts authorized by the statute until the written assent of two-thirds of the
resident tax-payers was obtained and filed in the office of the County Clerk.
The money, when obtained, was directed to be paid over to the president and
directors of a railroad company then about to be organized for the construction
of a railroad through the town. Instead of borrowing the money, the Supervisor and Commissioners executed and delivered the bonds directly to the railroad
company in payment for stock for which they were authorized to subscribe, and
these were subsequently sold by the company at a discount. Each of the bonds,
upon which the plaintiff brought his action, stated that the requisite consent of
the tax-payers had been obtained and properly filed, with a certificate of the
County Clerk that a paper, purporting to be the written assent, &c., had been
filed in his office. The statute did not authorize the giving of this certificate,
nor did it prescribe in what method the written assent should be proved. No
evidence was offered that the consent had been given other than what is above
stated. The bonds on which the suit was brought were payable to bearer, and
the plaintiff was a holder for value.
1. Held, that the power to-borrow was not properly complied with.
2. That the provision requiring the assent of the tax-payers, as evidenced, was a
condition precedent to the issue of the bonds, and an indispensable prerequisite
to their validity.
3. That, in the absence of all direct proof that the written assent had been
obtained, the town was not estopped by the acts of its agents, who had issued
bonds asserting upon their face that it had been, even though it had, for a coUsiderable period, acquiesced in their acts. Such consent should have been proved
affirmatively. The case does not come within the rule that when a power is conferred, if the agent does an act which is apparently within the terms of the
power, the principal is bound by the representation of the agent as to the existence of any extrinsic facts essential to the proper exercise of the power where
such facts, from their nature, rest peculiarly within the knowledge of the agent.
The defect consists in the existence of the power itself, and if it did not, the
facts requisite to the validity of the bonds being created by statute, were not
peculiarly within the knowledge of the town.
1 We are indebted to the courtesy of Mr. Ch. Judge Selden, for the following

opinion, for which he will accept our thanks.-Es. A. L. Reg.
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9. The fact thaf the bonds were negotiable, and purchased for value without notice
of the defect, does not, under such circumstances, aid the plaintiff.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SELDEN, Ch.J.-The bonds or obligations upon which this action
was brought, purported to have been issued by the Supervisor and
Railroad Commissioners of the town of Sterling, pursuant to sec.
1 of the act of June 22, 1851, authorizing these officers, under
certain circumstances, to execute such bonds. Several objections
were made, upon the trial, to their validity. The statute authorized
the Supervisor and Commissioners "1to borrow" a sum not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars, upon the credit of the town, and
"to execute therefor, under their official signatures, a bond or
bonds," &c. The money, when obtained, was directed to be paid
over to the president and directors of a railroad company then
about to be organized for the construction of a railroad through
the said town, "to be expended by them in grading and constructing" such road.
Instead of borrowingthe money, the Supervisor and Commissioners executed and delivered the bonds in question directly to the railroad company in payment for stock for which they were authorized
by the act to subscribe, and they were subsequently sold by the
company at a discount. The question is, whether this was within
the authority conferred by the act? It is clearly not within its language. No money was borrowed, and nothing else was authorized
by the terms of this act. If, however, what was done was the same
in effect, as if the money had been borrowed and paid over to the
railroad company, the difference in form would not be material.
But it is plain that, neither in respect to the railroad company or
the town, was its effect the same. If the statute had been pursued,
the company would have had a sum equal to the par value of the
bonds to expend upon their work. As it was, they were compelled
to sell the bonds at a discount, in order to realize the money.
. If the railroad company could sell at a discount at all, it could
of course sell at any sacrifice, however great. The bonds of the
town of Sterling for twenty-five thousand dollars might have been
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sold for ten thousand. Can it be supposed that if such a power
had been specifically asked of the legislature, the request would
have been granted? Would the town have been permitted to incur
a debt, to be paid by taxation upon its inhabitants, of twenty-five
thousand dollars, for the sake of furnishing the railroad company
with ten thousand to be expended upon its works? I think not;
and yet this is, in effect, the power which it is claimed was conferred
by the act authorizing the town to borrow. The rate of discount,
whether more or less, can make no difference with the principle.
Had the town itself made the sale, and paid over the avails to
the railroad company, it seems to me entirely clear that the transaction would have been illegal. It is usual for the legislature,
when conferring upon a municipal or other corporate body the
power to raise money upon the faith and credit of the corporation,
to guard against such a sacrifice. An example of this may be
seen by referring to the act amending the charter of the city of
Rochester, passed July 3, 1851. By sec. 12 of that act, the Common Council were authorized to create a public stock not exceeding
thirty thousand dollars, to be applied to the erection of a City
Hall, and for that purpose to issue bonds or certificates in the usual
form. They were also authorized to sell and dispose of such bonds
or certificates "1upon such terms" as they should deem most advantageous to the city, "but not for less than par." By sec. 285 of
the amendatory act, power was also conferred upon the Common
Council to borrow, upon the faith and credit of the city, a sum not
exceeding three hundred thousand dollars, at a rate of interest not
exceeding seven per cent., and to issue bonds therefor; and, by sec.
286, they were authorized to sell and dispose of such bonds upon
such terms as they might deem most advantageous, and to invest
the proceeds in the Genesee Valley Railroad Company; but they
were expressly prohibited from selling them for less than par.
The reason why such a prohibition was not inserted in the act
under consideration, can be readily seen. By each of the sections
of the act amending the charter of the city of Rochester, to which
I have referred, the Common Council were expressly authorized to
sell the bonds, and hence the necessity for the restriction. In the
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present case the only authority given by the act is to borrow upon
the bonds of the town. No express power to sell the bonds is
given, and no such power can be implied. To borrow money, and
give a bond or obligation for it, and to sell a bond or obligation for
money, are by no means identical transactions. In the one case,
the money and the bond would, of course, be equal in amount. In
the other, they might or might not be equal. Hence, a mere
authority to a corporation to borrow money upon its bonds, is
equivalent ex vi termini to an authority to dispose of its bonds at
par, and no further restriction is necessary.
But it is true, the town did not itself sell the bonds, or make any
sacrifice upon them. It transferred them to the railroad company
at par in payment of stock for which it was authorized to subscribe.
This, however, in my view, does not strengthen the plaintiff's case.
It was as much a departure from the terms of the statute, as if the
town had itself sold the bonds at a discount, and was equally inconsistent with its object and intent, which was, that the railroad
company should receive a sum equal to the amount of the debt
incurred by the town to expend upon the road, in the completion
of which the town was supposed to have an interest. It is a wellsettled and salutary rule in respect to every statutory authority
of this kind, that the statute must be strictly pursued. In this
case there is not only a literal but a substantial difference between
the course pursued and that pointed out by the statute. It follows
that the bonds were illegally issued, and were consequently void in
the hands of the railroad company; and as the referee has expressly found that the plaintiff became the purchaser with full knowledge that the bonds had not been issued for money borrowed, but
in payment for the stock of the company, he is in no better situation than the railroad company itself.
There is another objection which is equally fatal to the validity
of the bonds. Sec. 1, of the Act of 1851, after conferring upon
the Supervisor and Railroad Commissioners power to issue the
bonds, concludes with a proviso to the effect, that these officers
should have no power to do any of the acts authorized by the
statute until "the written assent of two-thirds of the resident per-
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sons taxed" in the town, as appearing upon the last assessment
roll, should have been obtained and filed in the Clerk's office of
Cayuga County. Each of the bonds upon which the action was
brought, stated upon its face that the requisite assent had been
obtained and filed, and to each was attached a certificate in the
following words: " Cayuga County, Clerk's Office, ss: I, Edwin
B. Morgan, Clerk of the County of Cayuga, hereby, certify, that
a paper purporting to be the written assent of two-thirds of the
resident tax-payers of the town of Sterling, with the affidavit
required by sec. 1 of the Act referred to by its title in the foregoing bond, has been filed in this office."
The statute did not authorize the giving of any such certificate,
nor did it provide for the filing of any affidavit, or prescribe in
any manner the evidence by which the written assent should be
established. The paper referred to in the certificate was also produced from the files of the Clerk's office, with a number of names
attached. This paper, together with the certificate, was read in
evidence under objection by the defendant's counsel. No evidence
was given or offered of the genuineness of the signatures; nor that
the subscribers were non-resident tax-payers of the town of Sterling; nor that the persons whose names were appended, if taxpayers, would constitute two-thirds of the whole number. The
defendant's counsel moved for a non-suit for want of such evidence, and the motion was denied.
It was not contended upon the argument, if the obtaining of the
written assent of two-thirds of the tax-payers pursuant to the
statute is to be regarded as an indispensable pre-requisite to the
exercise of the .power to issue the bonds, that the evidence was
sufficient under the ordinary rules of evidence to establish the
fact. But it was claimed on the part of the plaintiff,
1. That the provision in regard to the consent of the tax-payers
was not intended as a condition precedent, but merely as directory
to the Supervisor and Commissioners; and that whenever those
officers were satisfied that such consent had been given, they had
power to act.
2. That the town was estopped by the acts of its agents, in
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executing bonds, asserting upon their face that the requisite
assent had been obtained and filed, and negotiating these bonds
with the certificate of the County Clerk annexed; especially after
having acquiesced for a considerable time in such acts.
3. That the bonds are negotiable instruments, and that the
plaintiff is a bona fide holder without notice of the defect.
The first of these positions is obviously untenable. It is quite
impossible to construe the proviso in the statute as embracing a
mere direction to the officers upon whom the authority is conferred. It was plainly intended to make the obtaining of the
assent of the tax-payers a condition precedent to the exercise of
the power. Its words are : "1Provided always that the said Supervisor and Commissioners shall have no power to do any of the acts
authorized by the act until, &c." This admits of but one interpretation. It would be impossible to create a condition by language more explicit. The want of proof, therefore, that this condition had been complied with must be fatal to the recovery, unless
the plaintiff is protected as a bona fide purchaser, or can maintain
his position that the town is estopped.
The estoppel contended for is supposed to result from that rule
of the law of principal and agent pursuant to which it is held, that
when a power is conferred, if the agent does an act, which is
apparently within the terms of the power, the principal is bound
by the representation of the agent, as to the existence of any
extrinsic facts, essential to the proper exercise of the power, where
such facts from their nature rest peculiarly within the knowledge
of the agent. This is the doctrine asserted in the case of Farmers'
and MAechanics' Bank vs. Butchers' and -Drovers'Bank, 16 N. L.
R. 137. No representation of the agent as to the fact of his
agency, or as to the extent of his power, is of any force to charge
the principal. But it being shown by other evidence that the
agency existed, and that the act done is within the general scope
of the power, the principal is bound by the representation of the
agent as to any essential facts known to the agent, but which the
party dealing with him had no certain means of ascertaining.
The reason upon which that rule is founded is that given by

GOULD vs. THE TOWN OF STERLING.

Lord Holt, in Hern vs. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289, viz.: that where
one of two innocent parties must suffer through the misconduct of
another, it is reasonable that he who has employed the delinquent
party, and thus held him out to the world as worthy of confidence,
should be the loser. This reason can, of course, only apply to a
case where the principal has himseyf employed the agent, and
voluntarily conferred upon him power to do the act. This clearly
is not such a case. The agents here were designated not by the
town, but by the legislature; and no power whatever was conferred by the town, unless the assent of the tax-payers was
obtained. Any representation therefore by the Supervisor and
Commissioners in respect to such assent, would be a representation
as to the very existence of their power. Such representations as
we have seen are never binding upon the principal. It is obvious,
therefore, that the doctrine of the case of the Farmers' and
i Ichanics' Bank vs. The Butchers' and Drovers' Bank, has no
application to the present case. It is also inapplicable for another
reason. Knowledge of the facts in regard to the assent of the
tax-payers was in no manner peculiar to the Supervisor and Commissioners, but was equally accessible to the parties receiving the
bonds. The statute, of which they were bound to take notice,
apprised them, that the bonds could not be legally issued until the
requisite assent was obtained, and also that the assent when
obtained would be placed upon the files of the County, to which
all persons had access. The case is not therefore at all like that
of the Butchers' and Drovers' Bank, where the extrinsic fact
related to the state of the accounts of the bank with one of its
customers, which could only be known to the teller and other officers of the bank. Here the parties who received -the bonds, had
the means of ascertaining, and were bound to inquire as to the
existence of the facts, upon which, as they knew, the validity of
the bonds depended. (Note 1.)
The negotiability of the bonds in no manner aids the plaintiff.
It is true they are negotiable, and have in this respect most if not all
the attributes of commercial paper, (Note 2.) But one who takes a
negotiable promissory note or bill of exchange, purporting to be
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made by an agent, is bound to inquire as to the power of the
agent. Where the agent is appointed and the power conferred,
but the right to exercise the power has been made to depend upon
the existence of facts, of which the agent may naturally be supposed to be in an especial manner cognisant, the bona fide holder
is protected; because he is presumed to have taken the paper
upon the faith of the representation of the agent as to those facts.
The mere act of executing the note or bill amounts of itself in
such a case to a representation by the agent, to every person who
may take the paper that the requisite facts exist. But the holder
has no such protection in regard to the existence and nature of
the power itself. In that respect, the subsequent bona fide holder
is in no better situation than the payee, except in so far as the
latter would appear of necessity to have had cognisance of facts,
which the other cannot be presumed to have known.
There is an obvious distinction between this case and that of the
State of llinois vs. Delafield, 8 Paige, 527. There the State was
the party to be bound, and the State had by law appointed certain
officers its agents, and conferred upon them power to execute and
negotiate its bonds. The difficulty consisted in the irregular and
unauthorizeh manner in which the power was executed, not in the
creation of the power itself. The distinction is as plain as that
between conditions precedent and subsequent in general.
It follows from these principles, that until it was shown that the
written assent of the required number of tax-payers had been
obtained pursuant to the act, there could be no recovery upon the
bonds. The judgment of the Supreme Court must be reversed,
and there must be a new trial with costs to abide the event.
Note 1. The very important question
raised in this case as to the power of an
agent to bind his principal by his representations, is not yet so definitely adjudicated that any conclusions can be considered as commanding general assent,
A review of the positions established by
the principal decisions upon the subject
may not be unprofitable.

I. It seems entirely clear that no
representations by an agent can ever
establish the fact of agency. This proposition is true without qualification,
both at law and in equity. If a person,
who is not in fact authorized, represents
that he has power to execute a promissory note for another, the instrument, so
far as the supposed principal is con-
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cerned, is utterly void. The negotiability of the note will have no effect upon
the question, as the inquiry turns upon
the existence of the note itself. The
term "negotiability," pre-supposes the
existence of an instrument made by a
person having capacity or power to contract in that particular manner. Instruments made by infants, married women,
insane persons, or others without capacity to make binding contracts, gain no
additional validity because they may
assume the form of negotiable paper. It
is entirelj immaterial whether the incapacity or want of power is general, or
extends only to the particular act in
controversy. For similar reasons, an
agent can no more enlarge his powers
by means of unauthorized representations than he can create them. New
York Life Insurance and Trust Co. vs.
Beebe, 3 Selden, 364.
II. The inquiry then must be confined
to the question, what has the principal
said or done which bears upon the supposed agency? If the power cannot be
derived from his representations or acts,
it cannot exist at all. In analyzing the
acts of the principal, there appear to be
only two grounds on which he can be
held liable for the representations of his
a-ent: 1. That of identity; 2. That of
estoppel.
1. When it is sought to charge the
principal on the ground of his identity
with the agent, it must appear that he
has distinctly authorized the very act in
question. If the authority is written,
it is purely a question of construction;
if oral, and every element of estoppel is
absent, it is still necessary to investigate
the precise authority conferred. Every
act transcending the exact limits of
the power granted, is inoperative and
void.
2. The difficulty of the case arises
when it-is sought to apply the doctrine

of estoppel to the law of agency. The
inquiry then is, when shall the principal
be held liable, though he has not authorized, or perhaps when he has expressly
forbidden the act in question? It is
apparent that the ground of identity here
wholly fails. The agent is not the instrument of the principal. Notwithstanding this, the principal maybe liable.
The true ground on this subject must
be, that the principal may be liable for
the acts of the agent when he exercises
an employment which, by well-established usage, confers upon him certain
powers, or when the authority, in form
or in terms, includes the act in question.
In these cases, the principal may be
bound to third persons, though the agent
did an unauthorized act, provided they
had a right to act, and did in fact act,
upon the understanding that the agent
was authorized to proceed in the particular case. In the first class of cases, the
authority given by usage must be measuredby the usage. It cannot exceed this
by a hair's breadth. The only inquiry
is as to its exact limits and extent. This
point is well illustrated by the familiar
rule, that, by the usage of trade, a factor
has a power to sell on credit. This he
may do (contrary to express instructions
from the principal) to an honest purchaser. But, as usage gives him no
power to pledge goods, he cannot, in the
absence of a statute, confer upon an
honest pledgee a right to retain them for
advances actually made. It is conceived
that, upon this ground, the noted case of
Grant vs. Norway, 10 C. B. 664, is best
sustained. In this case, the master of a
ship having the power conferred by usage
to sign bills of lading for goods placed
on board of his ship for transportation,
executed fictitious bills of lading. Itwas
held, that though these passed into the
hands of bond fide assignees, they could
not sue the owner for the deceit. The
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action was on the case for deceit. The
power to sign bills of lading was notgiven
"directly by the owner, but by commercial
usaqe." The authority of the master could
not be exte'nded beyond such usage. The
opinion of the Court evidently rests solely
upon this ground. Says the Court: "The
authority of the master of a ship is very
large, and extends to all acts that are
usual and necessary for the use and
enjoyment of the ship. So with regard
to goods put on board, he may sign a bill
of lading, and acknowledge the nature,
quality, and condition of the goods. Constant usage shows that masters have that
general authority; and if a more limited
one is given, a party not informed of it
is not affected by such limitation."
"Is it then usual, in the management
of a ship carrying goods for freight, for
the master to give a bill of lading for
goods not put on board? For all parties
concerned have a right to assume that
an agent has authority to do all which is
usual." After showing that it was not
usual to sign such bills, the Court proceeds: "If then, from the usage of trade
and the general practice of shipmasters,
it is generally known that the master
derives no such authority from his position of master, the case may be considered as if the party taking the bill
of lading had notice of an express limitation of his authority." Pp. 686-7-8.
This case is then authority simply for
the proposition that, when an effort is
made to bind the principal by the usages
of trade, the authority is to be limited by
the usage as well as created by it. In
this point of view, it is impossible to
doubt the soundness of the decision. It
has often been cited, however, as establishing another and quite a different
doctrine. But the statement of the case
shows that the turning point must have
been the proper construction to be given
to a well settled usage. Precisely the

same view must be taken of the case of
Freeman vs. Buckingham, 18 How. U. S.
182. The charterer of a ship, by a fraud,
induced the master to sign fictitious bills
of lading, and the question here was as
to the usage. The Court make the decision rest upon a similar ground, citing
with approbation the case of Grant vs.
Norway, although the. reasons upon
which that decision rests were not presented with entire fulness. See also
Walter vs. Brewer, 11 Mass. 99.
If we now examine the second class
of cases we shall find no such accurate
limitation of authority, as where the extent of a usage isin question. It is evident
that the principal may, if he sees fit,
bestow an unlimited authority. The inquiry then must be, what is the legitimate
inference to be drawn from the statements or acts of the principal, as viewed
by one who gives credit to them in good
faith? The inference may be derived
from a series of recognitions of the
agent's act or from direct employment.
It is believed thatthe followingprinciples
are applicable. 1. The authority or employment must, in form or apparently,
include the act in question. If this were
not so, we should be led to the conclusion that an agent might establish an
agency by his own representations.
2. The acts or representations of the
agent must naturally lead to the conclusion, that the supposed authority does
exist. In other words, he must, in substance, affirm that the act in question
forms no exception to the general delegation of authority. Such an affirmation is
not to be regarded as creating an agency,
but simply as an assertion that what has
previously appearedtobe trueby the representations of the principal, is actually
true. 3. The representations must have
been made directly to third persons, so
as to have induced their action and to
have created a privity of contract between
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the principal and such person. 4. The
fact that the particular actwas notwithin
the general delegation of power, must
have been peculiarly within the knowledge of the principal. Very little discussion of this subject can be found in
the earlier cases. It has been pressed
upon the attention of modern jurists on
account of the fact, that a large class
of commercial business is performed
through the medium of agents, especially
that which is transacted by corporations.
We are inclined to think that the doctrine
itself is a modern one. The case which
is usually cited, is Herne vs. Nichols, 1
Salkeld, 289. It was decided by Lord
Ch. J. Holt atNisi Prius : "In an action
on the case for a deceit, the plaintiff set
forth that he bought several parcels of
silk for silk; whereas it was another
kind of silk, and that the defendant well
knowing this deceit, sold it to him for
silk. On trial, upon not guilty, it
appeared that there was no actual deceit
in the defendant, who was the merchant,
but that it was in his factor beyond sea;
and the doubt was, if this deceit could
charge the merchant; and Holt, Ch. J.,
was of opinion that the merchant was
answerable for the deceit of his factor,
though not crimninaliter, yet civiliter; for
seeing somebody must be a loser by this
deceit, it is more reason that he that employs and puts a trust and confidence
in the deceiver should be a loser than a
stranger, and upon this opinion the
plaintiff had a verdict."
From this
meagre report of the case, its doctrine
would seem quite doubtful as applicable
to agentsingencral,because it has been distinctly "held, after thorough discussion,
that. a mere power to sell does not of
itself include a power to warrant: Brady
vs. Todd, 9 C. B., N. S. 596-7, (1861;)
and a fortiori does not include a power
to misrepresent the qualities of the
article. If the decision were made to

depend upon peculiar rules applicable to
factors, it would become, as before stated,
a question of usage. The true ground
of the decision is, doubtless, indicated
by Cresswell, J., in Coleman vs. Riches,
16 C. B. 117. He says: "Herne vs.
Nichols was a case of misrepresentation, not fraud; the defendant there adopted
the act of the factor." When placed upon
this ground, the decision can be readily
understood. The subsequent recognition
of the act was upon general principles,
equivalent to a prior command. Otherwise, it would be plainly repugnant to
the case of Southern vs. How, 2 Croke,
469-70-71. In that case, three counterfeit jewels were fraudulently sold by the
factor of the defendant to the plaintiff in
Barbary, for goodjewels. Theirvalue was
£100, and were sold for £800. The plaintiff, regarding them as valuable, sold
them to the King of Barbary, who, discovering their true character, imprisoned
the plaintiff until he repaid the £800.
It appeared that the defendant was not
cognisant of the fraud of the factor.
The Court inclined against the plaintiff,
upon the ground that, as the master did
not command the servant to conceal the
character of the jewels, he shall not be
charged if the servant exceeds his power.
The doctrine of Herne vs. Nichols, if. so
qualified, is supported by the recent case
of Udell vs. Atherton, 4 Law Times, N.
S. 797. In that case, the principal authorized the agent to sell a log of mahogany. He fraudulently concealed a
defect in the article, making at the same
time a wilful misrepresentation in
respect to it. The principal was innocent; but, as he retained the benefit of the
contract, he was held liable in an action
for deceit. The form of action was the
same as in Herne vs. Nichols.
The
opinion of Wilde, B., is especially
noticeable. Mr. Addison, in his recent
work on torts, makes the same distinc-
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check, certified by a special agent, whose
authority is limited to cases where the
bank has funds of the drawer in hand,
can enforce payment of the check, provided the bank has no such funds.
It will be observed, that the statement of the question excludes cases of
the first class where usage is an element.
No usage was pretended, and no argument drawn from cases of that sort can
be relied upon. The Court laid very
considerable stress upon thatwell-known
rule of the law of partnership, that one
of the parties may, notwithstanding express restrictions, bind the firm upon a
contract made within the scope of his
employment. It would, however, seem
that the power of the individual partner
belonged to the first class of cases. It
is conferred, not by special authority,but
by law. This view is taken by the Court
of Common Pleas in England in a very
recent case, (1861)-Brady vs. Todd, 9
C. B., N. S., 596-7-Erie, C. J., delivering the opinion. "Partners have an
authority conferred upon them by law in
the same manner as masters of ships."
p. 604. The Court expressly distinguish
this class of cases from those where the
principal holds out that the agent has an
authority, and induces another to deal
bank was in the habit of certifying the with the agent on the faith of the reprechecks of customers with the knowledge sentation.
of the officers of the bank, and was proDismissing, then, the case of partners,
vided with a book for the express purpose masters of ships, &c., from view, from
of keeping a memorandum of such what source can the authority of the
checks. He was under express instruc- teller be derived? We think that the
tions not to certify when the drawer of
question of negotiability is not involved.
the check had no funds. In direct viola- It must ever be borne in mind, that the
tion of his instructions, he certified want of a power to make an instrument,
checks for a person who had no funds to being a question of capacity, is a defect
his credit, and they came into the hands which defeats it at law, and makes it
of an honest holder for value. Upon this utterly void.
An instrument must at
state of facts the bank was held liable. least exist before it can be negotiable.
The question was admitted for the pur- For this reason the important case of the
poses of the case to be, whether a bona State of Illinois vs. Delafield, 8 Paige,
fide holder for value of a negotiable 527, S. C. in Error, 2 Hill, 159, is not
tian.

He says: "If a fraudulent act

has been committed by the agent, and
his act is adopted, and the principal
takes the benefit of the contract, he is
liable in an action for deceit;" (citing
1 Scott, N. R. 685 ;) "but if the principal repudiates the transaction, and the
representation is not within the scope
of an agent's ordinary authority, he is
not liable."
10 C. B. 688. It is not
intended to deny that the reason given
by Lord Holt is a good one in a proper
ase, but only to question its applicability to the facts as they appear in
Salkeld.
This class of authorities is evidently
but of little weight in respect to the
question of the responsibility of the principal where the act of the agent imposes
a burden upon him, and he seeks, as soon
as it is ascertained, to repudiate it, and
where there is no settled usage to determine the agent's authority. As far as
can be ascertained, this question has not
been distinctly presented in any of the
English cases. It came up recently (1857)
in the State of New York in the case
of.The Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank vs.
The Butchers' and Drovers' Bank, 16 N.
Y. (2 Smith.) 125; S. C. 14 N. Y.
(4 Kern,) 623. The teller of the latter
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parallel In that case an agent was the purchaser acquired the check upon
restricted from selling certain negotiable the faith and representation of the agent
bonds of the State of Illinois below par, that it was included within the class of
or on credit. In violation of his instruc- cases to which his authority extended.
tions, he passed them to Delafield, who This principle woud include all cases
was cognisant of his breach of duty. where the measure of authority was
Delafield was prevented by injunction derived from the act of the principal, and
from negotiating them, on the ground, another acted upon the representation.
that if they passed into the hands of an Thus, if there were no rule of law or usage
honest holder, the State must pay them. limiting the authority of masters of ships
But in this case the bonds were valid to sign bills of lading, any person exinstruments, having been duly ezecuted pressly authorized to execute them might
according to statute. Even a wrong-doer bind his principal even if goods were not
might have transferred them to anvhonest put on board, if a consignee acted upon
purchaser without reference to the ques- the faith of the certificate that the goods
tion of agency. But the question in the had been shipped for his use by the concase of the Butchers' & Drovers' Bank signor. See Walter vs. Brewer, 11 Mass.
was, whether the instruments were pro- 104. In other words, the difference
perly executed, or even existed at all.
between Grant vs. Norway and the case of
Assuming, then, that the power of an the Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, is simply
agent to create an instrument must be this: in the one the authority is estabmeasured in all cases by the same gene- lished by law, and as such cannot exceed
ral principle, it would appear that the the legal limit; in the other, the authoordinary rules of the law of estoppel in rity is directly conferred by act of the
pais must be invoked whenever it is principal, and may extend so far as he
sought to make a principal liable for the pleases, or he may so clothe his agent
unauthorized acts of an agent, which he with an apparent authority as to make
seeks to repudiate. The rule appears to him liable upon the rules applicable to
be accurately stated inNorth River Bank estoppels inpais. Consequently, as new
vs. Aymar, 3 Hill, 270: "Whenever the -cases arise not affected by a well defined
very act of the agent is authorized by the usage, the liability of the principal must
terms of the power, that is, whenever, by be ascertained solely from the proper
comparing the act done by the agent, inferences to be drawn from his acts.
with the words of the power, the act is If tellers of banks, for a long period, by
in itself warranted by the terms used, a well settled usage, had authority merely
such act is binding on the constituent as as tellers to certify checks for customers
to all persons dealing in good faith with only who had funds, we apprehend that
the agent. Such persons are not bound the negotiability of the check would not
to inquire into facts aliunde. The appa- protect even a bona fide purchaser when
rent authority is the real authority." there were no funds. In fact, the very
Though the rule is enunciated as to limitation by the usage gives the purwritten powers, its principle extends to chaser notice of a want of-authority, and
other cases. Upon this theory the case puts him upon inquiry, and upon that
of the Butchers' & Drovers' Bank was fact of implied notice the case of Grant
correctly decided. The Bank had au- vs. Norway turned. It remains to exthorized the teller to sign instruments in plain one or two cases which may appear
form, including the one in question, and to conflict with these views. The first
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is Coleman vs. Riches, 16 C. B. 103. It
appeared in that case that the plaintiff
was a corn dealer, who bought corn
which was delivered at the defendant's
wharf by the vendors. The defendant,
or his agent, was in the habit of giving
receipts to the vendors, and it was the
practice for the plaintiffs to pay such
vendors for the corn stated in the receipts
to have been delivered. The plaintiff's
agent wilfully gave a receipt in a particular case to a person who had not delivered any corn to the plaintiff's use, and
the plaintiff, in accordance with his usual
practice, paid such supposed vendor.
He then sued the defendant for the loss
occasioned by the fraud of the agent.
There was no evidence that there was
any agreement between defendant and
plaintiff, to give these receipts, but they
appeared to have been mere memoranda
between the defendant and the sellers.
They were voluntary, and not designed
to influence the plaintiff's conduct. On
this ground the defendant was held not
to be liable. Says Jervis, C. J. : "I do
not see how Riches' (def't) knowledge
that Coleman (pl'ff) was in the habit of
paying the vendors on the production of
his receipt acknowledging the delivery of
the wheat, makes his giving such a receipt a representation to Coleman." p.
106. So Cresswell, J.: "I have looked
carefully through the evidence, and have
failed to discover anything from which we
can infer any such course of dealing as
would render the defendant liable to the
plaintiff for the fraudulent representation of his agent. To do so we must
assume that there was some contract
between the parties, that a receipt should
be given only upon the delivery of the
wheat, in order that the plaintiff might
be protected from paying for it before it
was sent. There clearly was no evidence
to warrant that. It may be true that
Coleman was in the habit of paying for

the corn he purchased, upon the production of a receipt, and that Riches knew
it. But the defendant had nothing to do
-with the plaintiff's manner of conducting
his business. It leaves the case just as it
was before." p. 119. The other Judges
express similar views.
This case simply holds that an estoppel cannot arise unless the representation
of the -principal was made to the third
party, so that he had a right to act upon
it. It is quite apparent from the case,
that if there had been an understanding
between the parties that the receipts
were to be given, the defendant would
be liable for the fraud of his agent.
Thus that able Judge, Williams, J., says
in the same case: "If there had been
evidence of an agreement between the
plaintiff and defendant, that the latter
should furnish the vendor with receipts
on the delivery of the corn, upon the
faith of which receipts the former should
pay the price, I must confess I should
have felt great difficulty in saying that
the defendant would not be liable for the
fraud of an agent, by means of which the
plaintiff had been induced to part with
his money on the faith of such delivery
having taken place." The same idea
pervades the opinion of the other Judges.
Another case, which it may be well to
distinguish, is that of the Mechanices'
Bank vs. New Haven Railroad Co., 3
Kernan, 699. A corporation had appointed a transfer agent, who was authorized, in the ordinary manner, to transfer
existing shares of stock upon the books
of the company, and to give the usual
certificates to the transferree. In company with a confederate, he issued spurious certificates, purporting that his
confederate was entitled to certain shares
of stock. These were indorsed in blank,
and pledged to the plaintiff, who made
advances upon them in good faith. They
were not transferred to him upon the
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books of the corporation. The Court
held that he acquired no right to any
stock, and that the railroad corporation
was not liable in damages for the fraudulent act of the agent.
The ground of this decision is, that
the principal is not directly liable for the
unauthorized act of the agent, and that
the law of estoppel was not applicable,
because no representationwas mnade to the
plaintif. The transfer of the stock certificate furnished no evidence of a contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant.
In fact, the stock was not assignable at
law, being a mere chose in action, but, by
the peculiar rules of equity jurisprudence, the assignor was converted into a
trustee for the assignee. It is one of the
most elementary principles of equity law,
that the assignee in such a case obtains
no more right than the assignor, unless
lie can show a direct and distinct representation made to himself, by the person
liable, upon the faith of which he made
the purchase. As no such representation
was shown, and as his assignor had
no rights against the railroad company,
he had none. The case is not inconsistent with the principles hitherto
established. In this connection negotiability becomes important. It cannot aid
aninstrument which does not come either
within the actual or apparent power of
the agent. But when a negotiable instrument is in form. though not in fact,
authorized, and the person who takes it,
is privy to the agent's fraud, though he
has himself no rights against the principal. he can make him liable by transferring it to an honest holder. The
negotiation connects the representation
of the principal with the holder, and
makes him privy to a contract.
To sum up the conclusions attained;
it has been shown that an agent cannot
create an authority by his own representations, but that in all cases the conduct

of the principal is the subject of inquiry.
The principal can become liable on two
grounds: that of identity and of estoppel.
Upon the ground of estoppel he may be
liable either where there is a fixed usage
-respecting the agent's authority, orwhere
an apparent power is conferred by direct
authority. In the case of usage, the
authority is limited by the usage itself.
In an authority expressly or actually
conferred, the inquiry must be whether
the principal in form held out the agent,
as having power to do the act in question,
to the party who acted upon it, and whether the third person did accordingly act
in good faith. If so, the principal is
liable. But where the agent did the act
without being held out as authorized, ihe
principal is not liable, even though he
knew the conduct of the agent. He is
also not liable where the agent fraudulently creates an unauthorized chose in
action in confederacy with another, and
such other transfers the chose in action
to an innocent assignee. This last proposition rests upon the peculiar rules of
equity jurisprudence as applied to the
assignment of choses in action.
Note 2. It may now be regarded as settled law, that bonds of a certain class are
to be deemed negotiable. Thisisnot true,
of course, of ordinary bonds which are
only assignable in equity. The doctrine
of negotiability has been extended to
exchequer bills, (4 Barn. & Ald. 1,) government bonds, (Gorgier vs. Mieville, 3
Barn. & C. 45; Long vs. Smith, 7 Bing.
284; Delafield vs. State of Illinois, 8
Paige, 527, s. 62, Hill, 159,) and other
municipal bonds, such as those of towns
and counties. Bank of Rome vs. Village
of Rome, 19 N. Y., 5 Smith, 20; Gould
vs. The Town of Sterling, supra; contra,
Deaman vs. Lawrence County, 37 Penn.,
(1 Wright,) 353, (1860.) The Court in
this case admits that its view is contrary
to the current of American decisions.

